Purpose & Design Principles
VisaChief.com prepares and manages visa applications. At the point of lodgement, and thereafter for status and requests for further information, the platform must exchange data with a department's visa processing system. The Government Integration Layer is the single component that performs that exchange.
It exists so that the department integrates with one hardened, contract-bound, independently assessable interface - never with the platform's internal services, and never with an AI component directly.
Design principles
- One door. All departmental traffic passes through the integration layer. No other VisaChief component may open a connection to a departmental endpoint.
- The department controls its own ingress. We connect on the department's terms - its gateway, its allow-list, its throttles, its certificate policy. We hold no credential capable of writing directly to a departmental data store.
- Deterministic boundary. Everything crossing the boundary is produced by deterministic code against a validated schema. AI-assisted output is reviewed by a registered migration agent before it can be packaged for lodgement.
- Signed, versioned, idempotent. Every payload carries a schema version, a signature and an idempotency key, so a retry can never create a duplicate case.
- Evidence by default. Every exchange writes an immutable audit record that the department can read, export and reconcile against its own logs.
- Sovereign by construction. The layer runs only in Australian regions; region pinning is enforced by policy-as-code, so a deployment elsewhere fails at the control plane.
- Degrade safely. If the department is unavailable, work queues durably and replays in order. Nothing is silently dropped and nothing is lodged twice.
This is a reference architecture. It shows a complete, implementable design and the options a department may choose between. It is not a claim of an existing connection to any particular departmental system. The binding design - endpoints, schemas, volumes and cutover - is agreed during design authority review and recorded in the integration schedule to the contract.
Reference Architecture
Reading left to right: the people and systems that originate work, the VisaChief platform that prepares it, the integration layer that packages and transmits it, and the departmental environment that assesses and decides.
| Channels | VisaChief platform | Integration layer | Department |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visa applicants - web and mobile; MFA; explicit consent capture | Edge and WAF - DDoS absorption, bot management, TLS 1.3 | Integration API gateway - OAuth 2.0 client credentials over mTLS | Department API gateway - agency-controlled ingress and throttling |
| Registered migration agents - case review, evidence sign-off, lodgement | Application and case services - wizard, workflow engine, agent portal | Schema mapping and validation - department data model and code tables | Case management and decision - assessment, decision and record of outcome |
| Department case officers - federated SSO via SAML 2.0 or OIDC | Encrypted document vault - field-level encryption, HSM-held keys | Queue, retry and idempotency - exactly-once delivery, ordered replay | Identity and document checks - document and identity verification services |
| Sponsors and institutions - employers, universities, channel partners | AI assistance services - completeness, classification, drafting | Audit, provenance and replay - immutable log, visible to the department; key and certificate broker - HSM-backed issuance, rotation, revocation | Biometrics and health panels; fees and reconciliation |
- Every cross-boundary call is mutually authenticated with certificate pinning; payloads are signed, versioned and idempotent.
- The department controls its own ingress. VisaChief holds no credential that can write directly to a departmental data store.
- Personal information never leaves Australian regions; the integration layer is the only component permitted to egress to the department.
Component Specification
Each element of the integration layer has a single responsibility, so that a control can be tested in isolation and a failure has a bounded effect.
| Component | Responsibility | Key controls |
|---|---|---|
| Integration API gateway | Terminates the connection to and from the department; the only network path across the boundary | Mutual TLS with certificate pinning, OAuth 2.0 client credentials, per-client rate limits, full request and response logging |
| Schema mapping and validation | Translates the internal case model to the department's data model and validates every field before transmission | Strict schema validation, code-table lookup, rejection of unmapped or out-of-range values, no silent coercion |
| Package builder and signer | Assembles the lodgement package - structured data plus documents - and signs it | Deterministic assembly, manifest checksums, detached signature, schema version stamped into the payload |
| Queue, retry and idempotency | Guarantees ordered, exactly-once delivery under failure | Durable queue, idempotency keys, exponential backoff with jitter, poison-message quarantine, operator-visible dead-letter handling |
| Callback receiver | Accepts signed status events from the department, or polls where inbound connections are not permitted | Signature verification, replay window, nonce tracking, strict payload allow-list |
| Audit, provenance and replay | Records every exchange in an append-only store and can reproduce exactly what was sent | Immutable storage with independent retention, hash-chained entries, department-accessible export |
| Key and certificate broker | Manages the cryptographic material used at the boundary | HSM-held private keys, automated rotation, revocation and expiry alerting, no plaintext key export |
| Reference data service | Holds department code tables, fee schedules and checklists | Version pinning, change notification, reproducible outputs tied to a stated version |
Network Topology & Zones
The deployment view matters as much as the logical view: it is what determines whether a compromise in one zone can reach applicant data or the departmental link.
| Zone | Contents | Boundary rule |
|---|---|---|
| Public edge zone | WAF, DDoS absorption, TLS 1.3 termination. Internet-facing. | Default-deny policy, mTLS between services |
| Application zone | Case services, agent portal, workflow. No public address. | Default-deny policy, mTLS between services |
| Data zone | Encrypted vault and databases. No route to the internet. | Readable only through the application zone's authorisation checks |
| Integration egress zone | The only component permitted to reach the department. | Holds departmental certificates; the only zone with an allow-listed route out |
- Segmentation is default-deny: each zone may reach only its declared dependencies, enforced by network policy rather than convention.
- The data zone has no route to the internet. Document and case data can only be read through the application zone's authorisation checks.
- The integration egress zone holds the departmental certificates and is the only zone with an allow-listed route out. Compromise of the edge or application zone does not yield the ability to transmit to the department.
- Administrative access to any zone is just-in-time, peer-approved and session-recorded; there is no interactive shell in production.
- Outbound egress from production is allow-listed to the department endpoint and a small set of named services. Inbound connections from the department are accepted only if the department elects the callback pattern; otherwise the integration layer polls and no inbound path exists at all.
Lodgement Data Flow
The sequence below is the standard path for a prepared application. Each numbered step writes an immutable audit record that the department can read and reconcile.
| Step | Actor | Action | Control applied |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Applicant | Submits evidence and grants explicit consent | Consent recorded; upload type-verified, malware-scanned and quarantined |
| 2 | VisaChief platform | Vault stores documents; AI completeness check runs | Field-level encryption; identifiers minimised before inference |
| 3 | VisaChief platform | Registered migration agent reviews and signs off | Mandatory human decision point; agent identity bound to the case record |
| 4 | Integration layer | Builds and signs the lodgement package | Schema validation against the department model; manifest checksums; detached signature |
| 5 | Department | Package transmitted to the department gateway | Mutual TLS, certificate pinning, idempotency key, backoff and ordered retry |
| 6 | Department | Acknowledges receipt and assigns a reference | Acknowledgement persisted to the immutable audit log |
| 7 | Integration layer | Status changes and requests for information returned | Signed callback or authenticated poll - the department elects which |
| 8 | VisaChief platform | Platform updates the case and notifies the agent | Tenancy-scoped authorisation on every read |
| 9 | Applicant | Notified; decision recorded against the case | Decision attributed to the department, never to VisaChief |
Integration Patterns & Protocols
| Pattern | Protocol | Typical use | Assurance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Synchronous API | REST/JSON over HTTPS, OAuth 2.0 client credentials, mutual TLS | Eligibility checks, status lookup, reference data | Per-call authentication, rate limits, full request logging |
| Asynchronous submission | Queued POST with idempotency key and signed payload | Lodgement packages and document bundles | Exactly-once delivery, ordered replay, acknowledgement receipts |
| Event callback | Signed webhook to a VisaChief endpoint, or authenticated poll | Status changes, requests for further information | Signature verification, replay window, poll fallback where inbound is prohibited |
| Bulk exchange | SFTP with PGP-encrypted payloads, or brokered object-store handoff | Batch reconciliation and periodic reporting | Key-pair authentication, manifest checksums, transfer receipts |
| Identity federation | SAML 2.0 or OIDC with SCIM provisioning | Department staff access to the case portal | The department's own directory and MFA policy govern access and revocation |
| Reference data sync | Versioned pull of code tables and legislative instruments | Visa subclasses, fees, document checklists | Version pinning and change notification so outputs stay reproducible |
Departments that cannot accept inbound connections use the poll variant of the callback pattern; nothing else in the design changes. Departments with an existing whole-of-government API gateway use the gateway-brokered interconnect and keep their standard onboarding process.
Interconnect Options
The department elects the connectivity model. All three carry identical application-layer controls - mutual TLS, signed payloads, idempotency and full audit. They differ only in network exposure and lead time.
| Option | Network exposure | Indicative lead time | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Private interconnect | None - private path only | Longest; depends on the department's existing interconnect | Preferred where the department already operates cloud interconnect |
| Mutual TLS over public internet | Public path, allow-listed and pinned | Shortest | Suitable for pilots and lower-volume integrations; upgradeable later without redesign |
| Gateway-brokered | Determined by the central gateway | Governed by the gateway's own onboarding | The department's standard integration process applies unchanged |
Security Controls at the Boundary
The controls below apply to every exchange regardless of pattern or interconnect. Full platform security is documented in the companion Security & Data Protection Dossier.
| Control | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Transport | TLS 1.3 with mutual authentication. Client and server certificates are pinned. Deprecated protocol versions and cipher suites are refused. |
| Client authentication | OAuth 2.0 client credentials bound to the presented client certificate, so a stolen token cannot be replayed from another host. |
| Payload integrity | Detached signature over a canonical form of the payload, plus manifest checksums for every attached document. A modified payload fails verification. |
| Replay protection | Nonce and timestamp with a bounded acceptance window; previously seen identifiers are rejected. |
| Idempotency | Every submission carries a client-generated idempotency key. A retry returns the original result rather than creating a second case. |
| Authorisation | Scoped credentials per environment and per interface. A sandbox credential cannot address production. |
| Rate and volume control | Client-side throttling to the department's published limits, with circuit breaking and backpressure so the department is never flooded. |
| Certificate lifecycle | HSM-held private keys, automated rotation, expiry alerting at 90, 30 and 7 days, and a rehearsed emergency revocation path. |
| Content safety | Documents are type-verified, malware-scanned and, for office formats, disarmed and reconstructed before they can be packaged. |
| Data minimisation | Only fields required by the department's schema are transmitted. Internal identifiers, model outputs and working notes are not. |
Schema & Reference Data Governance
Immigration rules change frequently. The integration must absorb that change without silent divergence between what the department expects and what we send.
- Explicit versioning. Every payload states its schema version. The department's supported versions are configured, not inferred.
- Additive change by default. New optional fields do not break existing consumers. Breaking changes require a new major version and a negotiated migration window.
- Contract testing. Schema conformance runs in our build pipeline against the department's published contract; a violation fails the build rather than reaching production.
- Code tables are pulled, not hard-coded. Visa subclasses, document types, fee schedules and country codes are synchronised from the department's reference data with a stated version.
- Reproducibility. Because outputs are tied to a pinned reference-data version, any past submission can be reproduced exactly as it was assembled.
- Change notification. The department is notified before we adopt a new schema or reference-data version in production, and either party may pause adoption.
Compatibility policy
| Change type | Handling | Notice |
|---|---|---|
| New optional field | Adopted additively; no consumer impact | Release note |
| New mandatory field | Treated as breaking; new minor version with a dual-run period | Agreed in advance |
| Field removal or type change | Breaking; new major version | Negotiated migration window |
| Code-table value added | Picked up automatically on reference-data sync | Change log |
| Code-table value retired | Existing in-flight cases continue on the pinned version | Change log plus impact list |
Environments & Conformance Testing
| Environment | Purpose | Data | Connectivity |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sandbox | Initial connectivity, certificate exchange, contract familiarisation | Synthetic only | Department test endpoint or mock |
| Staging | Conformance testing and pre-release validation, production-like configuration | Synthetic or irreversibly de-identified | Department test endpoint |
| Production pilot | Limited live volume under agreed caps | Live, with volume caps | Production endpoint |
| Production | Full service | Live | Production endpoint |
Conformance suite
- Happy-path lodgement across each visa product in scope, verified end to end against the department's acknowledgement.
- Negative cases: schema violation, oversized document, unsupported document type, missing mandatory evidence - each must be rejected cleanly with an actionable error.
- Failure injection: department endpoint unavailable, slow response, partial failure mid-batch, duplicate submission - verifying queueing, ordered replay and idempotency.
- Security tests: expired certificate, revoked certificate, invalid signature, replayed nonce, sandbox credential against production - all must fail closed.
- Reconciliation: a full day of traffic reconciled line-by-line between our audit log and the department's records, with a required zero-variance result before cutover.
No environment is promoted without documented exit criteria signed by both parties. Non-production environments never contain live personal information.
Error Handling & Reconciliation
The design principle is simple: fail loudly, never silently, and never twice.
| Failure | Behaviour | Visibility |
|---|---|---|
| Transient network or 5xx from the department | Exponential backoff with jitter, ordered retry within the agreed window | Retry count and outcome in the audit log; alert on threshold breach |
| Department endpoint unavailable | Work queues durably; nothing is dropped; replay resumes in submission order | Operational alert; agent-visible case status |
| Schema validation failure | Rejected before transmission; the case is returned to the agent with a specific field-level error | Agent notification; never silently corrected |
| Signature or certificate failure | Fail closed; no fallback to an unauthenticated path | Immediate security alert and escalation |
| Duplicate submission | Idempotency key returns the original result | Recorded as a duplicate attempt, not a new case |
| Poison message | Quarantined to a dead-letter queue after the retry budget; the queue is not blocked for other work | Operator review with a documented remediation path |
| Partial batch failure | Successful items are committed; failed items are isolated and replayed individually | Per-item outcome in the reconciliation report |
A daily reconciliation compares our audit log against the department's acknowledgements and flags any variance for investigation within one business day. The reconciliation report is available to the department.
Observability, Audit & Evidence
- Immutable exchange log. Every request, response, retry and acknowledgement is written to append-only storage with independent retention. Production credentials cannot alter or delete it.
- Department access. The department may subscribe to, or export, the audit records relating to its own integration - so it can reconcile against its records without relying on our assertion.
- Provenance. Each submission records the case, the agent who signed off, the schema and reference-data versions used, and the exact payload hash, so any past submission can be reproduced.
- Metrics. Volume, latency, error rate, retry rate and queue depth are reported against the performance targets below.
- Alerting. Certificate expiry, signature failure, authorisation failure, queue-depth growth and reconciliation variance all raise operational alerts with defined escalation.
- Incident notification. Any security incident affecting the integration is notified to the department within 24 hours of confirmation, with updates at agreed intervals.
Performance & Availability Targets
Targets are set at design authority review against the department's expected volumes; the figures below are the standard commitments in the absence of agreed alternatives.
| Measure | Target |
|---|---|
| Integration layer availability | 99.9% monthly, excluding agreed maintenance windows |
| Synchronous API response (95th percentile) | Under 800 ms, excluding department-side time |
| Lodgement package submission | Transmitted within 60 seconds of agent sign-off under normal operation |
| Status propagation to the case | Within 5 minutes of receipt of a callback, or one polling interval |
| Recovery point objective | 15 minutes or better for integration state |
| Recovery time objective | 4 hours or better for the integration layer |
| Queue drain after an outage | Full backlog replayed in submission order within the agreed window |
| Planned maintenance notice | Minimum 5 business days |
Responsibilities at the Boundary
Clear demarcation prevents the gaps where incidents happen.
| Item | VisaChief.com | Department |
|---|---|---|
| Integration layer build and operation | Owns | Reviews and approves the design |
| Interface specification and data model | Implements to specification | Owns the specification and code tables |
| Certificates and key rotation | Issues and rotates its own; supports pinning | Issues and rotates its own |
| Ingress control, throttling and quotas | Respects published limits | Owns |
| Payload content and completeness | Validates against schema and completeness rules | Owns assessment and the decision |
| Audit log of exchanges | Produces the immutable log and provides access | Retains per its own records authority |
| Reconciliation | Produces the daily report and investigates variance | Confirms against its own records |
| Incident notification across the boundary | Within 24 hours of confirmation | Per its own policy |
| Environment provisioning | Sandbox, staging and production on our side | Test endpoints and test data on its side |
| Change and release notice | Notifies before adopting a new schema version | Notifies of interface or reference-data change |
Onboarding & Assurance Path
Each gate has documented exit criteria signed by both parties. No gate is skipped, and volume is capped until the final gate closes.
| Gate | Exit criteria | Owner |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Design authority | Interface specification, data model, interconnect option and volumes agreed and recorded in the integration schedule | Joint |
| 2. Sandbox | Mutual TLS established, certificates exchanged and pinned, first authenticated call succeeds | Joint |
| 3. Conformance | Full conformance suite passed, including negative and failure-injection cases; results signed off | Department |
| 4. Security assessment | Independent penetration test of the integration completed; critical and high findings remediated and retested | VisaChief, evidence to the department |
| 5. Pilot | Agreed pilot volume processed with zero reconciliation variance over a continuous agreed period | Joint |
| 6. Cutover | Volume caps lifted, runbooks and escalation matrix published, support model live | Joint |
Assumptions, Dependencies & Open Items
Stated plainly, so that design authority review starts from an accurate position rather than an optimistic one.
| Item | Position | To be confirmed by the department |
|---|---|---|
| Departmental interface availability | This design assumes the department exposes, or will expose, a machine interface for lodgement and status | Whether such an interface exists today, and its specification |
| Lodgement authority | Final review and lodgement is performed by a registered migration agency in our partner network | Any additional accreditation the department requires |
| Inbound connections | Design supports both callback and poll | Whether inbound connections to VisaChief are permitted |
| Interconnect | Three options offered | Which option, and the department's lead time |
| Identity and document verification | Referenced generically | Which verification services are in scope and on whose credentials they are invoked |
| Volumes | Targets assume volumes agreed at design authority | Expected peak and average volumes |
| Retention | Configurable to the department's schedule | Applicable records authority and disposal schedule |
| Assurance requirement | IRAP assessment available, scoped to the engagement | Whether IRAP, and at what classification |
Indicative Interface Surface
Representative only. The binding surface is the department's published specification; where none exists, we propose the following as a starting point for design authority review.
| Operation | Method | Purpose | Idempotent |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reference data - code tables | GET | Retrieve visa subclasses, document types, fee schedule with version | Yes |
| Case - submit lodgement package | POST | Transmit structured application data and document manifest | Yes, via idempotency key |
| Document - upload | PUT | Transfer an individual document referenced in the manifest | Yes, via content hash |
| Case - acknowledge | GET | Retrieve the department reference assigned to a submission | Yes |
| Case - status | GET | Poll current status where callbacks are not used | Yes |
| Event - callback receiver | POST | Receive signed status and request-for-information events | Yes, via event identifier |
| Case - respond to request | POST | Submit further evidence against a departmental request | Yes, via idempotency key |
| Reconciliation - daily manifest | GET | Retrieve the day's submissions and outcomes for variance checking | Yes |
Glossary
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Integration layer | The VisaChief component that performs all exchange with the department |
| Idempotency key | A client-generated identifier ensuring a retried submission cannot create a duplicate case |
| mTLS | Mutual Transport Layer Security - both client and server present and verify certificates |
| Certificate pinning | Accepting only a specific, expected certificate rather than any certificate a public authority has signed |
| Detached signature | A cryptographic signature stored alongside, rather than inside, the payload it authenticates |
| Dead-letter queue | A holding queue for messages that cannot be processed, so they do not block other work |
| Conformance suite | The agreed set of tests a department requires before an integration may carry live traffic |
| Reconciliation variance | Any difference between our record of exchanges and the department's record |
Companion document: Security & Data Protection Dossier (Government Edition).