Architecture & interface guide

Government Integration Layer

How VisaChief.com connects to a department's visa processing system: the reference architecture, trust boundaries, data flows, integration patterns, interconnect options and the assurance path from sandbox to production cutover. Prepared for departmental solution architects, integration and API teams, design authorities and security assessors.

Rev 1.025 July 2026Owner: Chief Technology OfficerStatus: reference architectureDownload PDF
Section 1

Purpose & Design Principles

VisaChief.com prepares and manages visa applications. At the point of lodgement, and thereafter for status and requests for further information, the platform must exchange data with a department's visa processing system. The Government Integration Layer is the single component that performs that exchange.

It exists so that the department integrates with one hardened, contract-bound, independently assessable interface - never with the platform's internal services, and never with an AI component directly.

Design principles

  • One door. All departmental traffic passes through the integration layer. No other VisaChief component may open a connection to a departmental endpoint.
  • The department controls its own ingress. We connect on the department's terms - its gateway, its allow-list, its throttles, its certificate policy. We hold no credential capable of writing directly to a departmental data store.
  • Deterministic boundary. Everything crossing the boundary is produced by deterministic code against a validated schema. AI-assisted output is reviewed by a registered migration agent before it can be packaged for lodgement.
  • Signed, versioned, idempotent. Every payload carries a schema version, a signature and an idempotency key, so a retry can never create a duplicate case.
  • Evidence by default. Every exchange writes an immutable audit record that the department can read, export and reconcile against its own logs.
  • Sovereign by construction. The layer runs only in Australian regions; region pinning is enforced by policy-as-code, so a deployment elsewhere fails at the control plane.
  • Degrade safely. If the department is unavailable, work queues durably and replays in order. Nothing is silently dropped and nothing is lodged twice.
What this document is, and is not

This is a reference architecture. It shows a complete, implementable design and the options a department may choose between. It is not a claim of an existing connection to any particular departmental system. The binding design - endpoints, schemas, volumes and cutover - is agreed during design authority review and recorded in the integration schedule to the contract.

Section 2

Reference Architecture

Reading left to right: the people and systems that originate work, the VisaChief platform that prepares it, the integration layer that packages and transmits it, and the departmental environment that assesses and decides.

ChannelsVisaChief platformIntegration layerDepartment
Visa applicants - web and mobile; MFA; explicit consent captureEdge and WAF - DDoS absorption, bot management, TLS 1.3Integration API gateway - OAuth 2.0 client credentials over mTLSDepartment API gateway - agency-controlled ingress and throttling
Registered migration agents - case review, evidence sign-off, lodgementApplication and case services - wizard, workflow engine, agent portalSchema mapping and validation - department data model and code tablesCase management and decision - assessment, decision and record of outcome
Department case officers - federated SSO via SAML 2.0 or OIDCEncrypted document vault - field-level encryption, HSM-held keysQueue, retry and idempotency - exactly-once delivery, ordered replayIdentity and document checks - document and identity verification services
Sponsors and institutions - employers, universities, channel partnersAI assistance services - completeness, classification, draftingAudit, provenance and replay - immutable log, visible to the department; key and certificate broker - HSM-backed issuance, rotation, revocationBiometrics and health panels; fees and reconciliation
  • Every cross-boundary call is mutually authenticated with certificate pinning; payloads are signed, versioned and idempotent.
  • The department controls its own ingress. VisaChief holds no credential that can write directly to a departmental data store.
  • Personal information never leaves Australian regions; the integration layer is the only component permitted to egress to the department.
Section 3

Component Specification

Each element of the integration layer has a single responsibility, so that a control can be tested in isolation and a failure has a bounded effect.

ComponentResponsibilityKey controls
Integration API gatewayTerminates the connection to and from the department; the only network path across the boundaryMutual TLS with certificate pinning, OAuth 2.0 client credentials, per-client rate limits, full request and response logging
Schema mapping and validationTranslates the internal case model to the department's data model and validates every field before transmissionStrict schema validation, code-table lookup, rejection of unmapped or out-of-range values, no silent coercion
Package builder and signerAssembles the lodgement package - structured data plus documents - and signs itDeterministic assembly, manifest checksums, detached signature, schema version stamped into the payload
Queue, retry and idempotencyGuarantees ordered, exactly-once delivery under failureDurable queue, idempotency keys, exponential backoff with jitter, poison-message quarantine, operator-visible dead-letter handling
Callback receiverAccepts signed status events from the department, or polls where inbound connections are not permittedSignature verification, replay window, nonce tracking, strict payload allow-list
Audit, provenance and replayRecords every exchange in an append-only store and can reproduce exactly what was sentImmutable storage with independent retention, hash-chained entries, department-accessible export
Key and certificate brokerManages the cryptographic material used at the boundaryHSM-held private keys, automated rotation, revocation and expiry alerting, no plaintext key export
Reference data serviceHolds department code tables, fee schedules and checklistsVersion pinning, change notification, reproducible outputs tied to a stated version
Section 4

Network Topology & Zones

The deployment view matters as much as the logical view: it is what determines whether a compromise in one zone can reach applicant data or the departmental link.

ZoneContentsBoundary rule
Public edge zoneWAF, DDoS absorption, TLS 1.3 termination. Internet-facing.Default-deny policy, mTLS between services
Application zoneCase services, agent portal, workflow. No public address.Default-deny policy, mTLS between services
Data zoneEncrypted vault and databases. No route to the internet.Readable only through the application zone's authorisation checks
Integration egress zoneThe only component permitted to reach the department.Holds departmental certificates; the only zone with an allow-listed route out
  • Segmentation is default-deny: each zone may reach only its declared dependencies, enforced by network policy rather than convention.
  • The data zone has no route to the internet. Document and case data can only be read through the application zone's authorisation checks.
  • The integration egress zone holds the departmental certificates and is the only zone with an allow-listed route out. Compromise of the edge or application zone does not yield the ability to transmit to the department.
  • Administrative access to any zone is just-in-time, peer-approved and session-recorded; there is no interactive shell in production.
  • Outbound egress from production is allow-listed to the department endpoint and a small set of named services. Inbound connections from the department are accepted only if the department elects the callback pattern; otherwise the integration layer polls and no inbound path exists at all.
Section 5

Lodgement Data Flow

The sequence below is the standard path for a prepared application. Each numbered step writes an immutable audit record that the department can read and reconcile.

StepActorActionControl applied
1ApplicantSubmits evidence and grants explicit consentConsent recorded; upload type-verified, malware-scanned and quarantined
2VisaChief platformVault stores documents; AI completeness check runsField-level encryption; identifiers minimised before inference
3VisaChief platformRegistered migration agent reviews and signs offMandatory human decision point; agent identity bound to the case record
4Integration layerBuilds and signs the lodgement packageSchema validation against the department model; manifest checksums; detached signature
5DepartmentPackage transmitted to the department gatewayMutual TLS, certificate pinning, idempotency key, backoff and ordered retry
6DepartmentAcknowledges receipt and assigns a referenceAcknowledgement persisted to the immutable audit log
7Integration layerStatus changes and requests for information returnedSigned callback or authenticated poll - the department elects which
8VisaChief platformPlatform updates the case and notifies the agentTenancy-scoped authorisation on every read
9ApplicantNotified; decision recorded against the caseDecision attributed to the department, never to VisaChief
Section 6

Integration Patterns & Protocols

PatternProtocolTypical useAssurance
Synchronous APIREST/JSON over HTTPS, OAuth 2.0 client credentials, mutual TLSEligibility checks, status lookup, reference dataPer-call authentication, rate limits, full request logging
Asynchronous submissionQueued POST with idempotency key and signed payloadLodgement packages and document bundlesExactly-once delivery, ordered replay, acknowledgement receipts
Event callbackSigned webhook to a VisaChief endpoint, or authenticated pollStatus changes, requests for further informationSignature verification, replay window, poll fallback where inbound is prohibited
Bulk exchangeSFTP with PGP-encrypted payloads, or brokered object-store handoffBatch reconciliation and periodic reportingKey-pair authentication, manifest checksums, transfer receipts
Identity federationSAML 2.0 or OIDC with SCIM provisioningDepartment staff access to the case portalThe department's own directory and MFA policy govern access and revocation
Reference data syncVersioned pull of code tables and legislative instrumentsVisa subclasses, fees, document checklistsVersion pinning and change notification so outputs stay reproducible
Pattern selection

Departments that cannot accept inbound connections use the poll variant of the callback pattern; nothing else in the design changes. Departments with an existing whole-of-government API gateway use the gateway-brokered interconnect and keep their standard onboarding process.

Section 7

Interconnect Options

The department elects the connectivity model. All three carry identical application-layer controls - mutual TLS, signed payloads, idempotency and full audit. They differ only in network exposure and lead time.

OptionNetwork exposureIndicative lead timeNotes
Private interconnectNone - private path onlyLongest; depends on the department's existing interconnectPreferred where the department already operates cloud interconnect
Mutual TLS over public internetPublic path, allow-listed and pinnedShortestSuitable for pilots and lower-volume integrations; upgradeable later without redesign
Gateway-brokeredDetermined by the central gatewayGoverned by the gateway's own onboardingThe department's standard integration process applies unchanged
Section 8

Security Controls at the Boundary

The controls below apply to every exchange regardless of pattern or interconnect. Full platform security is documented in the companion Security & Data Protection Dossier.

ControlImplementation
TransportTLS 1.3 with mutual authentication. Client and server certificates are pinned. Deprecated protocol versions and cipher suites are refused.
Client authenticationOAuth 2.0 client credentials bound to the presented client certificate, so a stolen token cannot be replayed from another host.
Payload integrityDetached signature over a canonical form of the payload, plus manifest checksums for every attached document. A modified payload fails verification.
Replay protectionNonce and timestamp with a bounded acceptance window; previously seen identifiers are rejected.
IdempotencyEvery submission carries a client-generated idempotency key. A retry returns the original result rather than creating a second case.
AuthorisationScoped credentials per environment and per interface. A sandbox credential cannot address production.
Rate and volume controlClient-side throttling to the department's published limits, with circuit breaking and backpressure so the department is never flooded.
Certificate lifecycleHSM-held private keys, automated rotation, expiry alerting at 90, 30 and 7 days, and a rehearsed emergency revocation path.
Content safetyDocuments are type-verified, malware-scanned and, for office formats, disarmed and reconstructed before they can be packaged.
Data minimisationOnly fields required by the department's schema are transmitted. Internal identifiers, model outputs and working notes are not.
Section 9

Schema & Reference Data Governance

Immigration rules change frequently. The integration must absorb that change without silent divergence between what the department expects and what we send.

  • Explicit versioning. Every payload states its schema version. The department's supported versions are configured, not inferred.
  • Additive change by default. New optional fields do not break existing consumers. Breaking changes require a new major version and a negotiated migration window.
  • Contract testing. Schema conformance runs in our build pipeline against the department's published contract; a violation fails the build rather than reaching production.
  • Code tables are pulled, not hard-coded. Visa subclasses, document types, fee schedules and country codes are synchronised from the department's reference data with a stated version.
  • Reproducibility. Because outputs are tied to a pinned reference-data version, any past submission can be reproduced exactly as it was assembled.
  • Change notification. The department is notified before we adopt a new schema or reference-data version in production, and either party may pause adoption.

Compatibility policy

Change typeHandlingNotice
New optional fieldAdopted additively; no consumer impactRelease note
New mandatory fieldTreated as breaking; new minor version with a dual-run periodAgreed in advance
Field removal or type changeBreaking; new major versionNegotiated migration window
Code-table value addedPicked up automatically on reference-data syncChange log
Code-table value retiredExisting in-flight cases continue on the pinned versionChange log plus impact list
Section 10

Environments & Conformance Testing

EnvironmentPurposeDataConnectivity
SandboxInitial connectivity, certificate exchange, contract familiarisationSynthetic onlyDepartment test endpoint or mock
StagingConformance testing and pre-release validation, production-like configurationSynthetic or irreversibly de-identifiedDepartment test endpoint
Production pilotLimited live volume under agreed capsLive, with volume capsProduction endpoint
ProductionFull serviceLiveProduction endpoint

Conformance suite

  • Happy-path lodgement across each visa product in scope, verified end to end against the department's acknowledgement.
  • Negative cases: schema violation, oversized document, unsupported document type, missing mandatory evidence - each must be rejected cleanly with an actionable error.
  • Failure injection: department endpoint unavailable, slow response, partial failure mid-batch, duplicate submission - verifying queueing, ordered replay and idempotency.
  • Security tests: expired certificate, revoked certificate, invalid signature, replayed nonce, sandbox credential against production - all must fail closed.
  • Reconciliation: a full day of traffic reconciled line-by-line between our audit log and the department's records, with a required zero-variance result before cutover.

No environment is promoted without documented exit criteria signed by both parties. Non-production environments never contain live personal information.

Section 11

Error Handling & Reconciliation

The design principle is simple: fail loudly, never silently, and never twice.

FailureBehaviourVisibility
Transient network or 5xx from the departmentExponential backoff with jitter, ordered retry within the agreed windowRetry count and outcome in the audit log; alert on threshold breach
Department endpoint unavailableWork queues durably; nothing is dropped; replay resumes in submission orderOperational alert; agent-visible case status
Schema validation failureRejected before transmission; the case is returned to the agent with a specific field-level errorAgent notification; never silently corrected
Signature or certificate failureFail closed; no fallback to an unauthenticated pathImmediate security alert and escalation
Duplicate submissionIdempotency key returns the original resultRecorded as a duplicate attempt, not a new case
Poison messageQuarantined to a dead-letter queue after the retry budget; the queue is not blocked for other workOperator review with a documented remediation path
Partial batch failureSuccessful items are committed; failed items are isolated and replayed individuallyPer-item outcome in the reconciliation report

A daily reconciliation compares our audit log against the department's acknowledgements and flags any variance for investigation within one business day. The reconciliation report is available to the department.

Section 12

Observability, Audit & Evidence

  • Immutable exchange log. Every request, response, retry and acknowledgement is written to append-only storage with independent retention. Production credentials cannot alter or delete it.
  • Department access. The department may subscribe to, or export, the audit records relating to its own integration - so it can reconcile against its records without relying on our assertion.
  • Provenance. Each submission records the case, the agent who signed off, the schema and reference-data versions used, and the exact payload hash, so any past submission can be reproduced.
  • Metrics. Volume, latency, error rate, retry rate and queue depth are reported against the performance targets below.
  • Alerting. Certificate expiry, signature failure, authorisation failure, queue-depth growth and reconciliation variance all raise operational alerts with defined escalation.
  • Incident notification. Any security incident affecting the integration is notified to the department within 24 hours of confirmation, with updates at agreed intervals.
Section 13

Performance & Availability Targets

Targets are set at design authority review against the department's expected volumes; the figures below are the standard commitments in the absence of agreed alternatives.

MeasureTarget
Integration layer availability99.9% monthly, excluding agreed maintenance windows
Synchronous API response (95th percentile)Under 800 ms, excluding department-side time
Lodgement package submissionTransmitted within 60 seconds of agent sign-off under normal operation
Status propagation to the caseWithin 5 minutes of receipt of a callback, or one polling interval
Recovery point objective15 minutes or better for integration state
Recovery time objective4 hours or better for the integration layer
Queue drain after an outageFull backlog replayed in submission order within the agreed window
Planned maintenance noticeMinimum 5 business days
Section 14

Responsibilities at the Boundary

Clear demarcation prevents the gaps where incidents happen.

ItemVisaChief.comDepartment
Integration layer build and operationOwnsReviews and approves the design
Interface specification and data modelImplements to specificationOwns the specification and code tables
Certificates and key rotationIssues and rotates its own; supports pinningIssues and rotates its own
Ingress control, throttling and quotasRespects published limitsOwns
Payload content and completenessValidates against schema and completeness rulesOwns assessment and the decision
Audit log of exchangesProduces the immutable log and provides accessRetains per its own records authority
ReconciliationProduces the daily report and investigates varianceConfirms against its own records
Incident notification across the boundaryWithin 24 hours of confirmationPer its own policy
Environment provisioningSandbox, staging and production on our sideTest endpoints and test data on its side
Change and release noticeNotifies before adopting a new schema versionNotifies of interface or reference-data change
Section 15

Onboarding & Assurance Path

Each gate has documented exit criteria signed by both parties. No gate is skipped, and volume is capped until the final gate closes.

GateExit criteriaOwner
1. Design authorityInterface specification, data model, interconnect option and volumes agreed and recorded in the integration scheduleJoint
2. SandboxMutual TLS established, certificates exchanged and pinned, first authenticated call succeedsJoint
3. ConformanceFull conformance suite passed, including negative and failure-injection cases; results signed offDepartment
4. Security assessmentIndependent penetration test of the integration completed; critical and high findings remediated and retestedVisaChief, evidence to the department
5. PilotAgreed pilot volume processed with zero reconciliation variance over a continuous agreed periodJoint
6. CutoverVolume caps lifted, runbooks and escalation matrix published, support model liveJoint
Section 16

Assumptions, Dependencies & Open Items

Stated plainly, so that design authority review starts from an accurate position rather than an optimistic one.

ItemPositionTo be confirmed by the department
Departmental interface availabilityThis design assumes the department exposes, or will expose, a machine interface for lodgement and statusWhether such an interface exists today, and its specification
Lodgement authorityFinal review and lodgement is performed by a registered migration agency in our partner networkAny additional accreditation the department requires
Inbound connectionsDesign supports both callback and pollWhether inbound connections to VisaChief are permitted
InterconnectThree options offeredWhich option, and the department's lead time
Identity and document verificationReferenced genericallyWhich verification services are in scope and on whose credentials they are invoked
VolumesTargets assume volumes agreed at design authorityExpected peak and average volumes
RetentionConfigurable to the department's scheduleApplicable records authority and disposal schedule
Assurance requirementIRAP assessment available, scoped to the engagementWhether IRAP, and at what classification
Appendix A

Indicative Interface Surface

Representative only. The binding surface is the department's published specification; where none exists, we propose the following as a starting point for design authority review.

OperationMethodPurposeIdempotent
Reference data - code tablesGETRetrieve visa subclasses, document types, fee schedule with versionYes
Case - submit lodgement packagePOSTTransmit structured application data and document manifestYes, via idempotency key
Document - uploadPUTTransfer an individual document referenced in the manifestYes, via content hash
Case - acknowledgeGETRetrieve the department reference assigned to a submissionYes
Case - statusGETPoll current status where callbacks are not usedYes
Event - callback receiverPOSTReceive signed status and request-for-information eventsYes, via event identifier
Case - respond to requestPOSTSubmit further evidence against a departmental requestYes, via idempotency key
Reconciliation - daily manifestGETRetrieve the day's submissions and outcomes for variance checkingYes

Glossary

TermMeaning
Integration layerThe VisaChief component that performs all exchange with the department
Idempotency keyA client-generated identifier ensuring a retried submission cannot create a duplicate case
mTLSMutual Transport Layer Security - both client and server present and verify certificates
Certificate pinningAccepting only a specific, expected certificate rather than any certificate a public authority has signed
Detached signatureA cryptographic signature stored alongside, rather than inside, the payload it authenticates
Dead-letter queueA holding queue for messages that cannot be processed, so they do not block other work
Conformance suiteThe agreed set of tests a department requires before an integration may carry live traffic
Reconciliation varianceAny difference between our record of exchanges and the department's record

Companion document: Security & Data Protection Dossier (Government Edition).